Public ledger
Yes for the count. No for your name.
A blockchain can freeze the published totals so nobody quietly rewrites them. It is the wrong place for a phone number, a PIN, or which way a particular person voted. The same rule applies in Canada and the United States.
On the ledger
- The yea and nay total for each clause
- A hash of that total, so an edit is obvious
- Receipt codes that show a ballot was counted, without saying yea or nay
Never on the ledger
- Area code or the last four digits
- The PIN, which is never stored at all
- A legal name — this app does not ask for one
- How one person voted
- 1
You vote on this device. The ballot stays encrypted.
- 2
A ballot box, not the chain, adds one to yea or nay. It does not write your number beside the mark.
- 3
The new total and a receipt hash are pinned where anyone can read them.
- 4
You keep the receipt. If the published total changes without a matching set of receipts, the edit shows.
Tally anchor for this docket
····-····
Built from the yea and nay counts on this docket. This preview is not connected to a blockchain. The code is the same kind of fingerprint a public chain would store. It does not contain your vote.
Check a receipt
A receipt proves the votes on this device have not changed. It does not reveal them, and it is not a government audit number.
Seal a ballot first to get a receipt. Open your ballot
A chain does not make a vote legal, and it does not stop someone who watches you type the PIN. It only makes the published count hard to alter in secret.